Abstract
Introduction
Local government plays only a small role in the Jamaican system of government. In the 1980s local government was 'virtually dismantled' and its functions regionalised or subsumed by central government (CLGF, 2009 ). However, in recent years there has been renewed interest in decentralization and local government reform, although local
authorities have yet to regain many of the functions they once had and remain heavily dependent on central government grants. There is strong central control: the Ministry of Act added a degree of complexity to the system of local government in that the creation of PMC expanded the number of local authorities to fourteen, and in the process divided an existing administrative unit, with the potential for similar fragmentation elsewhere in Jamaica in years to come. The Municipalities Act 2003 does not define precisely the concept of 'municipality', but s3(3) makes it clear that their establishment is to reflect community aspirations for this new form of local government (electors and community organizations have to petition for a municipality), and should incorporate "a major urban centre that would be better served by a regime that is focused exclusively on managing the area in order to achieve sustainable and orderly development" (s3 (5)). The normal minimum population for a municipality is set at 50,000. Functionally, a municipality is effectively the same as a parish, but a lesser status is implied in that firstly, a municipality remains located within a parish and its council includes those parish councillors elected to the divisions that also constitute the municipality; and secondly, through a 'protective' provision of the Municipalities Act (s3(5)(e)) that "the establishment of the municipality is not likely to have any adverse effect on the adjoining communities or the parish in general."
A municipality is interpreted in this paper in libertarian tradition as a form of decentralization that is institutional in character. That is, a local government administrative unit, in this case a parish, is divided into smaller administrative units, effecting a shift in the locus of power from the capital town to other townships or neighbourhoods. Institutional decentralization can facilitate the development of direct democracies as decision-making is brought closer to communities. In this sense, then, the concept of 'municipalisation' may be described as the process of dismantling centralized decision-making in local government to facilitate citizens' active participation. A municipality in Jamaica is distinguishable from a parish in that it expands the democratic realm and specifically seeks to promote active citizen engagement at an appropriate scale. This is highlighted by two further provisions of the Municipalities Act that introduce a popularly elected mayor and establishment of a community-based Advisory This paper therefore focuses on the 'Portmore experiment' to gauge the success of creating a new municipality in terms of both administration and service delivery, and the extent to which the philosophy and practice of local/community self-management have been effectively institutionalised in its operations.
Consolidation or fragmentation?
As Leemans (1970:51) observes: "whenever a government wishes to fundamentally reform its system of decentralization, it tends to give primary attention to its overall structure, fitting other aspects such as allocation of powers and functions, size and boundaries of local government units into that structure." Thus scale enlargement, scale reduction, or cooperative arrangements/partnerships represent typical policy responses in decentralization reforms.
The optimal size of local government units has for a long time seized the attention of analysts and is contested between two viewpoints: the consolidationists (or centrists) who associate enlarged local government units with economies of scale, and advocates of community government (or polycentrists) who assert that small units are more conducive to grassroots democracy. For the consolidationists, large (in population) local government units facilitate inter alia, more effective local problem-solving, greater opportunities to raise revenue without disadvantaging any group, and more optimal functioning given the increased capacity to perform a variety of tasks, as well as increased scope for effective exercise of political responsibility given the greater ability of larger units to balance local needs and resources. Those who favour fragmentation of local government units cite the incompatibilities that exist between large size and democracy, resting their claim for reduced scale on facilitation of community sovereignty and ultimately, an expanded democratic realm. Large local government units, it is argued, have a tendency to become 'super governments' that have a propensity to be insensitive to the needs of localities. For an expanded exposition of these contending positions see 'classic' works such as Madison (1941) , Dahl (1967) , Sharpe (1970) , and Gunlicks (1981) ; and more contemporary writing such as Newton (1982 ), Magnusson (1986 , Kjellberg (1995) , King and Stoker (1996) and Schoburgh (2006) .
In recent years public choice theory has been highlighted by those favouring smaller local government units as a supporting argument to the case for decentralized democratic governance. Public choice theorists advocate for local government fragmentation, the fundamental value of which is an increased level of political representation and participation, but also see it as conducive to economic growth. This draws on Tiebout's (1956) thesis that residents are similar to consumers who 'shop' between different municipalities to find the one that has the right mix of taxes and public services, and that people's ability to choose forces towns to compete against one another making these towns better able to discover and serve the needs of their citizens. At the heart of the application of public choice ideas to local government structure are quasi market values, by which public choice scholars tend to consign local governments to being merely producers of services rather than political entities. The emphasis on managerialism over democratic politics has been one of the tensions evident in the application of public choice ideas to local government reform, and has formed the basis for an emergent 'neoprogressive' perspective that hypothesizes a new case for consolidation of local government (see for example Lowery, 1999a) . This challenges the public choice view that a fragmented system of local government is acceptable on the basis that individuals,
given adequate information about the performance of their local authority, can exercise either a voice or exit strategy if they become dissatisfied. Neo-progressives recognize the value of adequate information, but argue that fragmentation of institutions provides greater opportunities for blurring of functional responsibilities in local government, thus weakening democratic accountability. Further, that democracy is weakened when the primary response to dissatisfaction is the exit strategy. Neo-progressives also suggest that the ability of fragmented units to respond to metropolitan-wide problems is questionable.
Their thesis is that fragmented institutions preserve income inequality as a result of the disconnection between resources and needs (Hill 1974; Neiman 1976; Lowery 1999b ).
What perhaps has been overlooked in this discourse around the benefits or otherwise of fragmentation is that, depending on how the concept is applied, fragmentation could be 'managed' through overlapping spheres of political influence, as is the case with PMC and SCPC. Although the two local authorities are separate political and legal entities, they are linked by the provision of the Municipalities Act in law that means they share the same councilors (other than the mayor of PMC). Dual representation of this sort resides in a reform context in which norms of centralization are predominant and decentralization policies are implemented somewhat tentatively to ensure that existing power structures are not threatened. In an era of governmental change and reorganization, these issues of fragmentation vs consolidation in local government have taken centre stage alongside discussions on how to tackle problems arising from population dispersion and urban sprawl; the relationship between 'spillovers' and suburbanisation and ex-urbanisation; and local and regional economic development, among others. Reflecting these issues, a third perspective -the regionalists (see e.g. Nelson and Foster, 1999; Brenner, 1999; Lowery, 2000) -is also slowly gaining ground. The case for regionalism is mostly couched in socio-economic and ecological terms, as a way to combat urban inequalities. It complements the consolidationists by arguing that political fragmentation of metropolitan areas makes service provision, economic development and democratic voice difficult. Thus regional government is the solution, especially in dealing with the impact of globalization and the need to build new capacity to respond to global competition.
Differing views on the optimal size of local government units are inevitable as we seek the best means of assuring the functional integrity of local government while attending to its democratic genealogy. And of course, the differing contexts in which systems of local government operate, both socio-economic and political, is of fundamental importance in determining which body of ideas will prevail.
A profile of Portmore
The geographic space that is referred to as Portmore is in actuality an agglomeration of more than sixty distinct localities with a combined estimated population of 160,000. Resolution of the perennial problem of creating independent sources of revenue for local service delivery was also placed on the agenda. Accordingly, the policy envisioned the transformation of local government to enable its participation in the development process, especially in light of significant socio-economic changes that were occurring in communities and towns. Increased urbanization with negative externalities, combined with increased citizens' demands for improved local service delivery, placed inordinate pressure on local administrative structures. Moreover, socio-economic interdependence between communities and townships had blurred jurisdictional boundaries, occasioning the concept of Development Areas, a social construct employed to distinguish between the parish, the traditional unit of local government, and new centres of economic activity that competed with parish capitals. In the meantime, new ideas about sub-national policy and international political developments such as the disintegration of the communist bloc were spurring interest in institutional arrangements reflecting the concept of governance.
The combination of incipient conditions for transforming local government in the domestic sphere, and the ideas that were now informing contemporary policy practice, provided the underpinning for Ministry Paper 7 of 2003, which promulgated a second phase of local government reform based on the ideological premises of public choice.
Ministry Paper 7/03 assigned local government significant democratic value as seen in the overarching policy objective:
(T)he attainment of a strong and vibrant local government is essential to the attainment of a society in which all citizens enjoy real opportunities to fully and directly participate in and contribute to the management and development of local communities.
The paper saw local government reform and community development as complementary processes in the quest for citizen empowerment. It provided for the establishment of mechanisms to assure effective delivery of service to communities on a financially sustainable basis, and with the active involvement and participation of the citizens.
While Ministry Paper 8 of 1993 was primarily concerned with administrative reshaping, more so than political restructuring, Ministry Paper 7/03, with its concentration on democratic renewal, implied a shifting of the balance of power in favour of the local level. In this regard democratic governance became synonymous with a functioning local government. Teune's (1995: 9) view that "local governance has a built-in incentive for participation due to the immediacy of its actions and the ease of access of its workings compared to remote and complex national centres" captures the philosophical intent of the policy.
Thus grassroots advocacy for local self-management in Portmore and central government's design of local government reform policies were two distinct but parallel processes that coincided to create a 'window of opportunity' through which municipal status for Portmore was realized. This was a win-win game in that the residents of The Municipal Charter, granted by the Minister under the Municipalities Act, is the critical guidance instrument for efficient and effective functioning of PMC, and set the standard against which service provision within the municipality would be evaluated.
Closer examination of the governance structure reveals interesting administrative and policy tendencies that characterize the process of giving effect to local self-management.
Governance roles within the municipality are allocated among three institutional arrangements: (a) a decision-making, policy formulating, governing Municipal Council led by the Mayor and assisted by three full committees and four sub-committees; (b) an Advisory Council of representatives of civil society; and (c) a municipal office that is responsible to the PMC for the implementation of policy and administration of all the affairs of the municipality. These arrangements are now discussed.
Popularly elected mayor
This represents one of the most revolutionary changes in Jamaica's local electoral processes as well as the broader political system, and is a calculated action employed to enhance local democracy. This experience offers two crucial lessons. First, having a popularly elected mayor does not translate automatically into decentralized democratic governance. A popularly elected mayor is purely one step, albeit a major one, on the ladder of institutional arrangements that may appear mundane but which will create the policy and administrative ethos that will facilitate complete democratization. Second, decentralised democratic governance requires continuous efforts at both the local and central levels,
and an investment of core resources, including time and threshold financing, to enable norms of local self-management to evolve and flourish. The PMC was at the stage of experimentation and when adequate support for key principals at the local level is crucial.
The committee system
The PMC "executes every power and duty of that parish council under any public or private act, in respect of the municipality to which the power or duty applied immediately before the coming into force of the Municipalities Act" (Municipalities Act More important the Advisory Council did little to strengthen the link between the PMC and local communities.
Financing in the context of dual representation
Adequate and predictable sources of financing local government is an essential element of decentralization (Schoburgh 2006) , and this makes fiscal reform a major development issue (Smoke 1993 ). This fact is not lost on local government modernization in Jamaica as financing is identified as a priority issue in reform policies and is correctly associated with capacity enhancement and achievement of autonomy at the local level. But despite this acknowledgement local government financing remains problematic and was no less so for the newly created PMC. Like the Parish Councils, the PMC is funded from four main sources: the parochial revenue fund (PRF), 5 general revenues, 6 self-financing services, 7 and government grants. The remaining 75% of the motor vehicle licence fees is disbursed to each Parish Council on the basis of the number of miles of parochial roads in the parish expressed as a percentage of the total number of miles of parochial roads in the island. Disbursements from the PRF are used to finance road maintenance and property related services such as solid waste management, street lighting and beautification. 6 General revenue is made up of user fees and municipal charges. It includes items such as: trade licenses; barber and hairdresser licences; places of amusement licences; advertisements and billboards; and building and sub-division fees. 7 Self-Financing services consist of income generating enterprises run by the PMC. At the time of the review, the only commercial service entity within the portfolio of the municipality was the market. 8 Government Grants are given to PMC to assist with administrative costs .
… the biggest challenge that faces the Municipal Council is the lack of financial support from central government and the lack of autonomy…the problems posed by the shortfall in financial support from the government were made worse by the unpredictability of the revenue flow from the government…it is difficult to make programmed expenditure when one is not sure whether approved estimates and other promises will be honoured. If we had not run a tight ship we would have sunk…the expectations of the citizens far outstrip the capacity of the Municipal Council, since the Council is not well-equipped due to severe budget constraints to perform the wide range of functions that some citizens demand. (The Gleaner, April 16, 2005) What is striking is that a newly established local authority has from its inception operated under conditions of significant revenue shortfall arising from two factors: ( Dual representation together with the contentious issue of revenue generation and allocation has made the relationship between the PMC and SCPC tenuous, at best. What does this mean for the future? Is it possible for the municipality to achieve a greater level of independence in its operations without these tensions? It seems unlikely as fragmentation is inherently conflictual and some level of tension in organizational interactions should be anticipated. Biehl's (1998) ideas on municipalism appear relevant here: "existing power structure will hardly tolerate the existence of a confederation of democratized municipalities that has created a democratic politics, an empowered citizenry, and a municipalised economy."
Lessons in theory and praxis
Democratized decentralized governance represents the fundamental goal of PMC and is evident to varying degrees in the politico-administrative practices of the local authority. (e) reinforce internal organizational leadership; and (f) reduce the impact of party politics on local policy (Fenwick and Elcock 2005:62; Clark et al 1996) . These values are relevant in the case of the Portmore experiment, as a determination was made that a popularly elected mayor is a worthwhile and workable option in the empowerment strategy that underscores local government reform in Jamaica. However, implementation of the concept has highlighted some important lessons, particularly about the way in which politics conditions the relationship between management and political leadership at the local and central levels; the evident threats to organisational and individual power bases; the need for a supportive organizational framework; and the need for complementary reorientation of their political, administrative and policy outlook on the part of other locally elected representatives as well as communities. George Lee had this to say about his tenure as mayor:
In theory the office of elected mayor isolates you from direct politics/party influence as your power and authority came from the people and were supported in law. 
Conclusion
The Portmore experiment has demonstrated quite unequivocally that municipalism can be a viable option in local government organization in Jamaica. The PMC adopted an approach to local governance which has in some respects at least enabled communities to take more responsibility for the management of their affairs. Service delivery has attained fairly high standards despite the challenge of financing. Moreover, the initiatives taken to augment financial inflows into the municipality, along with the collaborative arrangements that have been attempted, signify a willingness to chart a new direction in local governance in Jamaica. Nonetheless, this review shows that more widespread application of the municipalisation process requires attention to a number of key factors if the next phase of implementation is to be less traumatic for local leadership and constituent communities:
• Administration: The protracted delay in providing the PMC with a dedicated secretariat and the difficulties experienced in staffing the Municipal Office must be corrected in order to avoid the impression that political expediency and gamesmanship, rather than a genuine concern for socio-political transformation and local government modernization are driving the empowerment strategy of local government reform.
• Viability: Adequate provisions must be made for the financing of the municipality. However, the Portmore experiment has shown that it is unwise to rely upon central government financial support as a means of achieving viability, and that local government must seek alternative sources of funding and in particular must reorient its functions towards an economic developmental role.
• Policy Focus: The idea of an Advisory Council is progressive and suggests a new orientation in local policy development. The Portmore experience illustrates, however, that how to successfully implement such a concept has to be clearly understood, and its successful adoption elsewhere depends on requisite material and human resources to enable it to fulfil its mandate.
• Dual representation: Dual representation has the potential to deflect attention from the core goals of the municipality if not regulated properly. Given its direct impact on the quality of local representation it is a matter that requires swift resolution.
